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Political staffers are an overlooked but increasingly relevant area of study. Not only are political 
parties increasingly dependent on their staff due to professionalization and decreasing activism 
among party members, many elected officials learn the ropes in these paid positions behind the 
scenes. As they became key players in the decision-making process of contemporary 
representative democracies, scholars have argued that the political involvement of staffers as party 
activists has decreased as a result of professionalization (Panebianco, 1988). Based on survey data 
collected among staffers (N=623), this paper examines if this assumption applies to the Flemish 
case by analyzing four indicators for party activism: current party membership, party membership 
prior to being hired, holding an internal party position and electoral candidacy. Furthermore, 
differences between subgroups of staffers are contrasted to understand which types of staff are 
more likely to have a political connection to their party. The results demonstrate that the party 
ties of political staff in Flanders, like other European cases, are considerably stronger than 
assumed by influential party models (Katz & Mair, 1995; Panebianco, 1988). Moreover, the 
analysis indicates that political involvement is the highest among staffers with political-strategic 
tasks and personnel at parliamentary party group groups. In conclusion, the impact of individual 
party-related factors such as ideological position, electoral strength and party age should be 
studied among a higher number of parties to determine which specific aspects of party culture 
might stimulate political involvement among staffers.  
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Introduction 
 
Paid staff members are omnipresent in today’s political parties and institutions. Following the 
historical development of party organizations, they have become involved in important aspects of 
the political process. The first political employees to catch the attention of political scientists were 
involved in extra-parliamentary party organizations, “running the party machine” (Michels, 1915). 
Up until today, staffers oversee membership administration and coordinate between central 
offices and local branches. Second, parties and elected officials have enlisted staff to support their 
activities inside public institutions. In legislative bodies, they assist MP’s in drafting legislation and 
controlling the executive branch of government. In their turn, ministers are accompanied by 
advisors with policy expertise within their respective portfolios. Third, the most infamous staffers 
are campaign strategists who advise parties and candidates on how to communicate and appeal 
to voters. The permanent campaign environment (Blumenthal, 1980) has led parties to hire social 
media managers and opposition researchers outside of election periods. Hence, political staff 
have a significant role in party organization, policy-making and communication. 
Although research on political staff is scarce (Webb & Kolodny, 2006), it is nonetheless a relevant 
area for empirical research. First, they hold a peculiar position as non-elected elites. Unlike other 
political elites that are often studied, staffers are involved in the political process without being 
elected. However, they often operate behind the scenes, an area that remains opaque to voters 
and the public at large. Yet in contrast to civil servants, their position as political appointee is 
inherently partisan and should be of interest to political scientists. Second, a considerable portion 
of political staff pursue elected office later on. Future MP’s and ministers increasingly gain 
experience through paid political work (Barber, 2014; Cowley, 2012). In such cases, unelected 
staff positions serve as a training ground for future elected officials, providing a novel, non-
traditional pathway to power (Taflaga & Kerby, 2019). Third, political parties have become more 
dependent on paid labor due to the continuing decline of party membership figures (Van Biezen, 
Mair, & Poguntke, 2012). While party members could initially serve as volunteers supporting the 
party organization, these diminishing free labor forces were replaced by paid employees. As a 
consequence, the role of paid staff is becoming increasingly important as political parties 
professionalize (Krouwel, 2012; Webb & Fisher, 2003; Webb & Keith, 2017).  
In this paper, the political involvement of Flemish party staffers from central offices, 
parliamentary party groups and ministerial offices is examined. After defining the key 
characteristics of political staffers, their political involvement and the variation between different 
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types of staffers are discussed from a theoretical standpoint. Based on these theoretical insights, 
hypotheses concerning the strength and conditions of the political connection between staffers 
and their party or developed and tested. It is argued that the Belgian is likely to demonstrate the 
limited applicability of influential party models (Katz & Mair, 1995; Panebianco, 1988), as was 
the case in earlier studies of European parliamentary democracies (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017; Webb 
& Fisher, 2003). Moreover, differences between subgroups of staffers are explored and tested by 
applying both a descriptive and explanatory analysis.  
 
Defining the population of staffers 
 
As operationalized in this project, political staffers are individuals with a remunerated, unelected 
position that have been politically appointed within a party’s central office, parliamentary party 
group or ministerial cabinet. We consider each of these individual properties (criteria) as 
necessary conditions for belonging to our population of interest.  In the following paragraphs, 
these four relevant criteria are discussed in more detail. While each criterion will be situated 
within existing literature on staff and party organization, we will also pinpoint which specific 
political agents are excluded by wielding these criteria.  
 
Table 1: Key characteristics of Political Staffers 
  Criterion Exclusion 
  Remuneration Volunteers 
  Unelected position Elected officials 
  Political appointment Civil servants 
  Inside organization/institution Independent consultants 
 
 
Our first criterion concerns the issue of remuneration: staff members receive a salary in return 
for their political activities. Applying this criterion makes an essential distinction between staff and 
volunteers like party members or sympathizers. The distinction between voluntary and paid 
political work is often interpreted as a historical transition from labor-intensive to capital-intensive 
forms of party organization (Farrell & Webb, 2002). Whereas voluntary party activists played a 
vital role within labor-intensive organizations, capital-intensive party organizations increasingly 
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rely on paid staff instead. Although voluntary agents certainly continue to be relevant to the 
political process, our interest lies with the individuals who are directly employed within party 
organizations or political institutions. Hence, the origin of their salary can either be the party 
payroll, the parliamentary party group or a ministerial office (Monroe, 2001; Webb & Kolodny, 
2006).    
 
Second, our notion of staffers is confined to unelected positions. As opposed to elected officials, 
staffers are hired and appointed by party organizations or political leaders. While both staff and 
elected officials are considered to be a part of a political class that lives ‘off’ politics (Borchert, 
2003; Von Beyme, 1996), the election of political leaders by voters or party members sets them 
apart from their advisors and aides. In fact, the peculiar position of staff as an unelected elite 
raises interesting questions in and of itself. While some have stressed their recruitment among 
grass roots activists as a sign of their similarity to party members (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017), others 
have demonstrated that their profiles and attitudes show more correspondence to elected elites 
(Fisher & Webb, 2003; Webb & Fisher, 2003). Of course, individuals can move between elected 
and non-elected political positions, as is clearly demonstrated by the growing number of elected 
officials with prior experience as political advisors (Allen, 2012; Barber, 2014).  
 
Third, the research project will be limited to formal politically appointed positions. Although we 
acknowledge that civil services can be subject to party patronage (Kopecký, Mair, & Spirova, 2012; 
Peters & Pierre, 2004), the politicization of public administration goes beyond the scope of this 
research project. Hence, the investigation will focus on staffers in positions that have deliberately 
been created for political appointments. Admittedly, staff and civil servants do not inhabit 
completely separate worlds: a considerable portion of political staff might have earlier 
professional experience or future ambitions as a civil servant (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017). In the 
Belgian case for instance, ministerial cabinet members are known to hop back and forth between 
public administration and ministerial cabinets (De Winter & Dumont, 2006). However, 
expanding our analysis to the civil service would make the group of respondents too large and 
heterogeneous. Therefore, we exclude civil service personnel that remains in position regardless 
of changes in the political leadership.  
 
Lastly, we will focus our attention solely on staff working within political organizations and 
institutions. This excludes the independent, external consultants who are often hired as strategists 
for electoral campaigns (Dulio, 2006; Farrell, Kolodny, & Medvic, 2001; Scammell, 1998). As 
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pointed out by Karlsen (2010), the direct political involvement of such external consultants has 
been somewhat overestimated in European political systems. As a result, research on political 
staff has been distorted by the image of ideal-typical professionals with a high level of 
independence and self-regulation. In most European democracies, however, cartelization has 
created a vast reservoir of public resources for parties to accumulate internal expertise in support 
of their elected elites. This paper deals with those internal experts, omitting the role of external 
consultants.  
 
 
Political staff and professionalization 
 
In 1921, Max Weber described two aspects to making politics one’s vocation. “Either one lives 
'for' politics or one lives 'off' politics” (Weber, 1921). Living ‘for’ politics entails a form of 
individual passion for all things political: individuals driven by such motivations attain personal 
satisfaction by exerting power and serving a cause. Living ‘off’ politics, however, addresses an 
individual’s financial dependence on the salary gained for holding a certain political position. As 
the author argued, both aspects apply to most elected officials – except for wealthy politicians with 
an external source of income. The same frame can elucidate the incentives of contemporary 
political staffers. As they depend on politics as a permanent source of income, they can clearly 
be considered to live ‘off’ politics. However, scholars have debated to what extent staffers actually 
live ‘for’ politics. How well are they integrated into the political project of the parties they work 
for? To what extent are they driven by professional and economical motivations?  
 
Existing literature on professionalization claims that the political connection between parties and 
their staff has been decreasing for decades (Panebianco, 1988; Webb & Fisher, 2003). The 
principal driver behind this evolution is the professionalization of political staff, with traditional 
party bureaucrats being ‘displaced’ by political professionals (Scammell, 1998). As described in 
the seminal work by Michels (1915), “the bureaucrat identifies himself completely with the 
organization, confounding his own interests with its interests” (1915, p. 138). In contrast, political 
professionals have less need for such “traditional identity incentives” (Panebianco, 1988, p. 232). 
Instead of political activism, this new breed of political professionals emphasizes vocational values 
such as technical expertise, career development and independence. Not surprisingly, the 
sociological ideal type of professionalism (exemplified by medical doctors or lawyers) provided 
the conceptual foundations behind the professionalization of political staffers. These insights were 
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consequently incorporated in party models such as the cartel party (Katz & Mair, 1995) and the 
business-firm party (Hopkin & Paolucci, 1999). Although empirical studies of staff are scarce, the 
limited research on European staffers has challenged this influential image of political 
professionals. Evidence from the United Kingdom and Norway has demonstrated significant 
political ties between parties and their staff (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017; Webb & Fisher, 2003). In 
both cases, the vast majority of staffers were active members within the party organization before 
their employment (see: Table 4). As a result, Karlsen & Saglie (2017) concluded that Norwegian 
staffers resemble unelected party politicians more than the theoretical ideal type of strategy 
professionals.  
 
This contrast between theory and practice seems to be driven by an American-inspired 
interpretation of political professionalism. However, the party-centered context of European 
parliamentary democracies creates a different habitat for staffers than the American candidate-
centered environment (Farrell & Webb, 2002). Based on these earlier empirical studies of 
European staffers, we anticipate that the majority of Flemish political staffers has considerable 
ties to their party. The contrast with the U.S., which served as the model for the theoretical work 
on professionalization, is clearly apparent concerning a fundamental point in this discussion: the 
strength of political parties. While American party organizations have been labeled as ‘empty 
vessels’ due their insignificance (Katz & Kolodny, 1994), Belgium is considered a textbook 
example of a partitocracy (De Winter & Dumont, 2000; Deschouwer, 2009). I argue that this 
contrast is driven by two institutional factors that shape the organizational setting in which staffers 
operate: the electoral system and political finance. First, the American FPTP system has led to 
decentralized political networks consisting of self-directed representatives, commercially-oriented 
consultants, think tanks and lobbyists. On the other hand, European proportional systems are 
dominated by institutionalized political parties with a centralized hierarchy. Second, this systemic 
contrast is reinforced by political finance. While the exceptionally high level of public funding in 
Belgium (Van Biezen & Kopecký, 2014) empower collective institutions such as central offices 
and parliamentary party groups, the flow of private funding in the U.S. is largely captured by the 
fundraising efforts among grassroots activists and donors by individual campaigns. In sum, 
American political staffers join an ‘enterprise-in–office’  headed by an individual candidate or 
elected representative (Monroe, 2001), whereas Belgian staffers are recruited within an 
institutionalized party bureaucracy. Hence our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: The majority of Flemish staffers have political ties to their party.  
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Understanding the party ties of staffers 
 
 
The analysis considers four types of party activism with an increasing degree of political 
involvement: current party membership, party membership prior to being hired, holding an 
internal party position and electoral candidacy. While the threshold for being a party member is 
considerably low, prior party membership signals a stronger initial connection. However, both 
types of membership remain passive forms of political activism. Hence, holding an internal 
position within the party organization (e.g. local section, youth wing, …) is considered as a type of 
activism with a higher threshold. Lastly, becoming an external ambassador for the party by 
standing for public office (e.g. communal, regional, national or European elections) signals the 
most intense form of activism among the four indicators.   
 
In addition to the general level of political involvement, this paper aims to investigate which type 
of staffers have the strongest ties to their party. For this reason, we will examine variation between 
the party ties of respondents by analyzing the differences between individual staffers, party 
branches and party organizations. From an individual perspective, we anticipate that staff with 
political-strategic tasks involving communication, policy or organization will have stronger party 
ties than their colleagues involved in administrative and technical tasks. As these staffers are more 
closely involved in the process of political decision-making, it can be expected that parties are 
more likely to recruit individuals with a proven record as party activist. Admittedly, this hypothesis 
contradicts the influential image of political professionalization (Panebianco, 1988), which claims 
that more professional tasks correlate with weaker party ties. However, it seems more likely that 
this study will confirm the observations of an earlier study on staffers in party-centered political 
systems (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017). 
 
H2: Staffers with political-strategic tasks have stronger political ties to their party.  
 
Concerning the anticipated the difference between party branches, we expect that staffers with the 
strongest party ties to be concentrated within the most influential branches. Similar to the 
argument on political-strategic tasks above, it can be assumed that party organizations will 
preferably recruit staffers with a strong political involvement for the party branches at the heart of 
political decision-making. In the Belgian context, two party branches stand out as particularly 
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influential. First, party leadership and their supporting staff reside at the central office, which 
serves as the nerve center of party decision-making (De Winter & Dumont, 2006; Deschouwer, 
2012). The allocation of staff even reflects this power balance. Although policy experts are paid 
through parliamentary resources, such as personal staff members for MPs or party group funding, 
they are often integrated into study centers at party headquarters (Pattyn, Van Hecke, Brans, & 
Libeer, 2014; Pattyn, Van Hecke, Pirlot, Rihoux, & Brans, 2017). Second, ministerial cabinets 
with an extensive number of appointed advisors have been a longstanding tradition in the Belgian 
political system (Gouglas, Brans, & Jaspers, 2015; Van Hassel, 1973; Walgrave, Caals, Suetens, 
& De Swert, 2004). As these ministerial cabinets are responsible for both policy coordination with 
coalition partners and the bulk of legislation, cabinet staffers operate close to important decision-
making. Hence, the party ties of parliamentary staff are expected to be the lowest in our second 
hypothesis:  
 
H3: Staffers from influential party branches have stronger political ties to their 
party. 
 
From the perspective of party families, we anticipate that staffers from traditional party families 
will have stronger party ties. The underlying argument is based on the Belgium history of 
pillarization, as traditional political mass movements such as Christian democrats, Liberals and 
Socialists structured civil society via extensive networks of collateral organizations for many years 
(Lijphart, 1968). Although a process of de-pillarization has been taking place for decades (van 
den Bulck, 1992), these collateral organizations remain key players within the Belgian 
neocorporatist political system. We anticipate that staff recruitment is likely to be facilitated by 
these organizational networks. In contrast, nontraditional parties in search for staff have to recruit 
more personnel outside of such existing networks. In addition to structural coordination 
mechanisms, it seems likely that the mutual exchange of personnel might be preferred by 
traditional parties to maintain ideological coherence within these pillars.  
 
H4: Staffers from traditional party families have stronger political ties to their party. 
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Data and method 
 
Our analysis relies on original survey data collected among the paid staff of five Flemish parties 
(Belgium). Although all parties represented in parliament were contacted, the extreme-right party 
(Vlaams Belang) chose not to participate. Between December 2018 and March 2019, the 
complete target population received a digital invitation to fill in an online questionnaire, followed 
up by two reminders. This questionnaire contained questions about staffers’ personal 
characteristics, professional experience, political attitudes, education, future ambitions and their 
interaction with colleagues and elected elites. Out of a population of 1781 individuals, the project 
obtained a response rate of 35% (N=623).  
 
Table 2: Response rates by party and party face 
 
Central 
office 
(N=147) 
Party in 
Parliament 
(N=190) 
Party in 
Government 
(N=286) 
All  
(N=623) 
CD&V (N=173) 53% 34% 26% 33% 
Groen  (N=42) 45% 49% - 46% 
N-VA (N=180) 40% 41% 26% 32% 
Open Vld (N=159) 47% 50% 33% 38% 
Sp.a (N=69) 44% 28% 45% 36% 
Total  47% 40% 29% 35% 
 
Unsurprisingly, the biggest organizations containing the most staffers have lower participation 
levels. The lowest response rates were recorded among the staff of Flemish-Nationalists (N-VA) 
and Christian Democrats (CD&V). Within parties, staffers working in ministerial cabinets were 
harder to motivate than their counterparts in central and parliamentary offices. As the response 
rate never drops below 25%, we are confident the sample offers a representative picture of the 
target population. Compared to the target population, women, staffers older than 35 and 
individuals working in ministerial offices are slightly underrepresented among respondents (see: 
Table 3). As the differences between population and sample remain limited, underrepresentation 
was not compensated by weighting our data.  
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Table 3: Representation by gender, age and party face 
 
 
Population 
(N=1781) 
Respondents 
(N=623) 
Gender 
    Female 
    Male 
 
42% 
58% 
 
41% 
59% 
Age 
   18 - 35 
   36 - 50 
   50 + 
 
34% 
42% 
24% 
 
38% 
39% 
23% 
Party faces 
   Central office 
   Party in Parliament 
   Party in Government  
 
18% 
27% 
55% 
 
24% 
30% 
46% 
 
 
 
 
Results 
 
 
Figure 1 visualizes the strength of political ties among Flemish staffers. From left to right, the 
indicators were arranged as steps with ascending levels of involvement as a party activist. 
Membership clearly presents the lowest threshold: eight out of ten respondents were party 
members at the time of the study. However, the level of membership prior to being hired is 
considerably lower: only around half of Flemish staffers were party members before being hired 
(48%). Although slightly higher, the portion of staffers with an internal position within the party 
organization (e.g. local section, youth wing, …) is comparable (52%). The highest level of 
involvement coincides with the smallest portion of respondents: 40% of staffers have been an 
electoral candidate for the party, either at the local, regional, national or European level.  
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Figure 1: Political ties of Flemish Staffers 
 
 
 
These findings indicate that being hired as a political staffer entails a process of ‘rapprochement’  
between staffers and their party. Getting professionally involved in politics produces an incentive 
to get politically involved as an activist as well. This process is illustrated by the contrast between 
party membership before employment and other indicators. First of all, membership shows a 
significant increase after staffers are hired. Second, about half of all staffers hold a position within 
the party organization. Although this portion is only slightly higher than membership before 
employment, the difference remains remarkable as an internal position requires significantly 
more time and effort. We argue that this process is driven by two aspects, one psychological and 
one institutional. From a psychological perspective, individual staffers without prior active 
involvement take a psychological step from passive supporter to active contributor as they get 
hired. Since deciding to get involved as a political staffer requires both professional and political 
considerations, this decision might spill over into voluntary political involvement. From an 
institutional perspective, the formal or informal institutions of party organizations likely have an 
impact. Either explicitly or implicitly, parties and elected officials have expectations about the 
political involvement their personnel. Some parties and elected officials stimulate the active 
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involvement of staff to ensure internal linkages between rank-and-file and elites. Others call upon 
their staff to keep the voluntary party machine afloat, compensating for the de-energization among 
party members (Van Biezen et al., 2012). 
 
Party ties index 
 
If one aims to study the political involvement of staff, its cumulative nature should also be 
captured in the analysis. Surely, a staffer with experience as both electoral candidate, internal 
party activist and longtime party member is more intensely connected to the party than a colleague 
who only bought a membership card. To capture these different levels of involvement, we 
constructed an additive index combining four indicators for political involvement into one 
measure (current party membership, party membership before employment, internal party 
positions and electoral candidacy). To calculate the index value for each individual respondent, 
these four indicators were transformed into dummy variables and added together. As a result, an 
individual score of zero signals no ties to the party whatsoever. Vice versa, a score of four 
illustrates a maximum individual involvement in party politics. 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the different proportions of index scores among respondents. While 
individuals without any form of party membership, internal position or electoral candidacy are 
categorized under ‘no ties’, respondents with very strong ties score positively on each of the 
separate indicators. Most respondents can be found at the extremes: many staffers are either 
heavily involved or not involved at all. However, the group with strong party connections clearly 
outweighs the uninvolved group: about half of the respondents have strong or very strong political 
ties. A middle group of about one out of ten has a moderate connection to the party. This 
illustrates that the recruitment strategy of Flemish parties values both active party members as well 
as applicants with no involvement in the party whatsoever. Whether one approaches the different 
types of political involvement separately or considers their cumulative nature by means of the 
party ties index, the results confirm the first hypothesis. The majority of Flemish staffers are at 
least party members. Moreover, almost half of the respondents either has strong or very strong 
ties to their party.  
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Figure 2: Party ties index values of Flemish Staffers 
 
 
 
 
 
Flanders vs. other cases 
 
 
Although these findings confirm that most Flemish political staffers resemble “unelected party 
politicians” (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017) rather than the depoliticized political professionals described 
by influential party models (Katz & Mair, 1995; Panebianco, 1988), notable differences with other 
European party democracies remain (see: Table 4). Contrary to our expectations, Flemish staffers 
have weaker ties to their party than their counterparts from Norway and the UK. This raises 
questions about the validity of the theoretical argument concerning the impact of partitocracy 
presented earlier in this paper.  
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Table 4: Political ties of European Staffers 
 
 Flanders
a, b, c 
 
Flanders
a, b 
 
Norway
 a, b 
 
UK
 a, b 
 
Currently a member 82% 90% 98% - 
Member before employment 48% 55% 78% 88% 
Position within party organization 52% 57% 78% - 
Electoral candidate 40% 44% - 55%  
a) Central office b) Parliamentary party c) Party in government 
Norway: Karlsen & Saglie (2017); UK: Fisher & Webb, (2003) 
 
 
Several elements can help to interpret contrast between expectations and reality. First, there’s the 
composition of the different population included in the comparison. While these earlier studies 
dealt with staffers from central – and parliamentary party offices, almost half of the respondents 
included in the Flemish case came from ministerial cabinets. When cabinet staffers are excluded 
from the analysis, the party ties of Flemish staffers are considerably higher (see: Table 4). 
Nonetheless, the lower level of Flemish staffers’ involvement persists after this adjustment. 
Second, the chronology of the different studies could point to a slow but steady decrease in 
political ties among staffers as described by influential party models (Katz & Mair, 1995; 
Panebianco, 1988). The respondents for this study were contacted six years after the Norwegian 
staffers and eighteen years after the British Labour employees. However, it is unlikely that a time 
frame of 6 years can explain variation concerning an evolution that was first described during the 
1980’s (Panebianco, 1988). Third, the data should be treated with caution due to the low number 
of available cases. The UK study cannot be generalized as it was limited to one particular party 
(Labour). Hence, only the contrast with Norwegian staffers can be considered an observable, 
systemic difference. At the very least, though, these findings suggest that systemic effects might be 
caused by a more complex set of causes.  
 
Comparing subgroups 
 
The political ties of staffers also show considerable variation within the Flemish population. In 
this section, we compare different subgroups to get a better understanding of which types of 
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individuals have closer links to their parties. The varying degrees of political involvement will be 
examined on three different levels: individual, party branch and party family. On the individual 
level, each respondent was one out of five categories based on their specific tasks: management, 
communication, political advice, organizational work or administrative tasks. Although this 
categorization was based on the work of Karlsen and Saglie (2017), an extra category was added 
for staffers in management positions (directors of central offices, party groups and ministerial 
cabinets). On the party branch level, staffers were grouped based on the principal location of their 
professional activities: the central office, parliamentary party or party in government. On the party 
level, each party was assigned to an ideologically labeled party family: Christian democrats, 
Liberals, Socialists, Ecologists and Flemish nationalists
1
.  
 
If one compares party ties of staffers based on their individual tasks, they roughly fall into three 
categories (see: Table 5). First, managers clearly display the strongest connection to their party on 
most indicators. Both their internal involvement in the party and their electoral experience set 
them apart from other colleagues. Second, staffers with political-strategic tasks such as political 
advice and communication show equally strong political ties. Compared to managers, however, 
their party membership rates are higher. This counterintuitive finding might indicate that 
managers experience less pressure to become a member after being hired. Third, administrative 
personnel consistently show the lowest political connection for each indicator. Staffers involved 
in organizational work seem to fall in between the second and third category. Concerning party 
membership, their political ties are as low as colleagues with administrative tasks. On the other 
hand, their internal – and electoral activism holds a middle ground between administrative 
personnel and political-strategic staff.  
 
Contrary to our expectations, parliamentary staffers have the strongest political ties. On all 
indicators included in this study, party ties are the highest among the personnel running the 
parliamentary activities of Flemish parties. On the other hand, the weakest political connection 
can be found among the ministerial staff. Regardless of the applied indicator, individuals working 
in ministerial cabinets are the least involved in party politics. We argue that this finding illustrates 
the often technical nature of cabinet activities. As ministerial cabinets are responsible for the bulk 
of Belgian legislative output, a considerable portion of cabinet staffers are recruited for their 
expertise in juridical – or policy matters. As a consequence, it appears that cabinet managers put 
                                                          
1 In the future, these categories will contain multiple parties as data from Walloon and Dutch parties will be added 
to the project.  
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less emphasis on the political involvement of candidates during the recruitment of cabinet staffers. 
However, cabinets are a long way from technical, depoliticized entities. Our findings demonstrate 
that a considerable portion of ministerial advisors and assistants are politically connected to the 
party. Central office staff hold a middle ground between their counterparts of the parliamentary 
party groups and ministerial offices as far as membership and internal involvement within the 
party organization are concerned.  
 
From the perspective of party families, we anticipated a contrast between traditional and non-
traditional parties. Although the results illustrate noticeable differences between these two types 
parties, our expectations where actually turned on their heads. Staffers of nontraditional party 
families (Greens, Flemish nationalists) have stronger political connections to their parties than 
their counterparts working for traditional parties (Christian democrats, Liberals and Socialists). 
Regardless of the applied indicator, staffers of non-traditional parties have the strongest political 
connections to their parties. The lowest degree of political involvement can be observed among 
two traditional party families: Christian democrats and  Socialists. One potential explanation 
could be staff size: recruiting outside the existing network might simply be a necessity for parties 
with larger organizations. One the one hand, parties with a limited body of staff such as the Greens 
(see: Table 2), are more likely to find enough skilled individuals among their core supporters. 
On the other hand, larger organizations such as the Christian democrats and Liberals might be 
compelled to recruit beyond their core supporters due to the sheer number of vacancies that 
need to be filled. However, this interpretation does not account for the strong party ties among 
the large group Flemish nationalist staff, nor does it offer an explanation for the comparably weak 
political connections among the limited number of Socialist staffers. Contrary to our expectations, 
it seems that traditional party families actually recruit talent outside of their direct environment.  
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Table 5: Political ties of Flemish staffers  
- organized by tasks, party branch and party family 
 
 Currently a 
member 
(N=508) 
Member before 
employment 
(N=296) 
Position within 
party organization 
(N=322) 
Electoral 
candidate 
(N=248) 
Tasks     
      Management 71% 53% 61% 49% 
      Communication 74% 50% 54% 40% 
      Political advice  76% 50% 54% 41% 
      Organizational work 61% 35% 46% 37% 
      Administrative 58% 34% 36% 30% 
Party branch     
      Central office 89% 49% 48% 41% 
      Party in Parliament 91% 59% 64% 46% 
      Party in Government 72% 39% 45% 35% 
Party family     
      Christian democrats  79% 47% 50% 36% 
      Liberals  79% 48% 51% 40% 
      Socialists  86% 42% 49% 36% 
      Ecologists   88% 57% 57% 52% 
      Flemish nationalists  83% 58% 66% 51% 
Total 82% 48% 52% 40% 
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Regression analysis 
 
To complement these descriptive findings, the political involvement of staffers in more depth by 
running a multiple logistic regression model for each indicator (current membership, prior 
membership,  internal position, electoral candidacy). The principal motivation behind this 
approach is to isolate the relationship between party ties (dependent variable) and a specific 
independent variable of interest (tasks, party branch, party family) by controlling for the impact 
of other variables. Separating these different relationships is essential to avoid drawing the wrong 
conclusions. The connection between organizational work and central offices is a case in point. 
As organizational work is exclusively carried out at party headquarters, a descriptive analysis of 
the observed values for organizational work might simply reflect the party ties of central office 
staff. However, the chosen approach should not be interpreted as a causal mechanism. The 
individual party ties of staffers are not caused by their individual tasks or the party (branch) they 
happen to work in. On the contrary, we would rather argue that the prior involvement of staffers 
probably affects the types of jobs they apply – and  get selected for.  
 
As the independent variables (tasks, party branch and party family) are categorical, each of them 
was recoded into separate dichotomous variables to suit a multiple logistic regression analysis. To 
get a better grasp of the surprising descriptive findings concerning party family (see: Table 5), a 
number of more fine-grained, party-specific variables were added to the model. As a result, the 
analysis can clarify whether variations in electoral strength, membership size, party age or 
ideological position are associated with the party ties of staffers
2
. Finally, two additional control 
variables on the individual level were added: age and gender.  
 
From a general viewpoint, the gender effect is striking in all but one model (see: Table 6). 
Apparently, female staffers are significantly less involved in party politics. Although there might 
be a gender imbalance in the type of tasks that staffers perform, this could not explain observed 
effect because the models already control for individual tasks. Overall, the first model concerning 
party membership covers the most variation (R2=0,183), while the model addressing electoral 
candidacy explains the least variation ((R2=0,065).  
                                                          
2 Electoral strength: percentage of votes during the most recent federal election.  
Membership size: absolute number of party members of the MAPP project (van Haute, 2014).  
Party age: years since the founding of the extra-parliamentary organizations. For traditional parties, 1946 was 
used as the starting point for the development of current party organizations.  
Ideological position: left-right scale (0-10), Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker, 2015; Polk et al., 2017). 
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Table 6: Odds ratio’s and S.E.’s of logistic regression models (N=597) 
 
 
Currently a 
member 
Member before 
employment 
Position within 
party organization 
Electoral 
candidate 
 
Tasks 
   (ref.: management) 
   Communication 
   Political advice 
   Organization 
   Administration 
 
Party branch 
   (ref.: cabinet) 
   Central office 
   Parliament 
       
Party organization 
  Electoral strength 
  Membership 
  Party age 
  Left-right scale 
 
Control variables 
  Female 
  Age 
 
 
 
 
1,534 (0,442) 
1,210 (0,613) 
0,885 (0,515) 
0,692 (0,429) 
 
 
 
1,299 (0,300) 
3,154 (0,278)*** 
 
 
2,285 (0,251)*** 
0,999 (0,000)*** 
1,955 (0,189)*** 
10,322 (0,595)*** 
 
 
0,582 (0,201)** 
1,007 (0,010) 
 
 
 
1,171 (0,390) 
1,010 (0,335) 
0,449 (0,484)+ 
0,640 (0,405) 
 
 
 
2,224 (0,276)** 
2,354 (0,217)*** 
 
 
1,224 (0,200) 
1,000 (0,000) 
1,184 (0,153) 
2,126 (0,502) 
 
 
0,466 (0,180)*** 
1,012 (0,008) 
 
 
 
0,949 (0,392) 
0,725 (0,339) 
0,735 (0,476) 
0,462 (0,404)+ 
 
 
 
1,160 (0,273) 
2,099 (0,217)*** 
 
 
1,375 (0,196) 
1,000 (0,000)+ 
1,279 (0,150) 
2,533 (0,492)+ 
 
 
0,591 (0,177)** 
1,006 (0,008) 
 
 
 
0,728 (0,383) 
0,692 (0,326) 
1,723 (0,473) 
0,504 (0,402)+ 
 
 
 
1,359 (0,274) 
1,443 (0,212)+ 
 
 
1,317 (0,201) 
1,000 (0,000) 
1,261 (0,155) 
2,571 (0,511)+ 
 
 
1,021 (0,177) 
0,995 (0,008) 
Constant 0,000 (9,153)*** 0,000 (7,386) 0,000 (7,251) 0,000 (7,436) 
Nagelkerke’s R² 0,183 0,140 0,118 0,065 
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Individual tasks and political involvement are only limitedly associated in the four models. None 
of the five different task categories are significantly associated with the political ties of staffers. 
Hence, the differences observed in the descriptive analysis were watered down considerably by 
controlling for other factors. However, the weaker ties of staffers with administrative tasks is 
reflected in the two models addressing the active forms of political involvement (internal position 
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and electoral candidacy), with a close-to-significant p-value (< 0.1). Combined with the descriptive 
analysis, this partially confirms our second hypothesis.  
Concerning the relationship between party branch and political ties, the model is consistent with 
earlier descriptive findings. Against our expectations, staffers from parliamentary party groups are 
significantly more involved than cabinet staff when it comes to membership and internal positions. 
On the matter of electoral candidacies, however, the effect is close-to-significant (p < 0.1). In 
addition to that, central office staffers are significantly more involved than cabinet personnel as 
members before being hired. As staffers with stronger party ties are significantly more present in 
parliament, our third hypothesis is rejected.   
 
Lastly, the results demonstrate clear differences between parties, at least as far as membership is 
concerned. The ideological orientation of parties has a significant impact on membership and 
nearly significant associations with internal positions and electoral candidacies. However, these 
values should be treated with caution because the data-set is only comprised of six Flemish parties. 
As a result, the values for party-level indicators are too interconnected to yield decisive results. 
The actual relationship between the political involvement of staffers and party strength, 
membership, party age and ideological position will manifest itself in a later stadium of the project, 
when Francophone Belgian parties and Dutch parties are added to the dataset. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This paper set out to describe the political involvement of Flemish staffers using four indicators: 
current party membership, party membership prior to being hired, holding an internal party 
position and electoral candidacy. As expected, the majority of Flemish staffers does indeed have 
some political connection to the party they work for. Moreover, a considerable portion even has 
a strong political involvement, combining at least three types of party activism. These observations 
confirm the results from earlier studies of staffers in European parliamentary democracies 
(Karlsen & Saglie, 2017; Webb & Fisher, 2003), which demonstrated that staffers are far from 
the depoliticized, ideal type professional described by influential party models (Katz & Mair, 
1995; Panebianco, 1988). However, longitudinal empirical studies have yet to be carried out to 
test the central claims of these theories, namely the decrease of the political ties of staffers through 
time. Furthermore, the analysis also demonstrated that international, systemic differences should 
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not be reduced to differences in the relative strength of parties. Although Belgium is considered 
a textbook example of partitocracy (De Winter & Dumont, 2003; Deschouwer, 2009), Flemish 
staffers are less politically involved than their counterparts in Norway (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017) 
and the British Labour party (Webb & Fisher, 2003).  
 
The second aim of this paper was to identify which staffers have stronger political links than 
others. However, the differences between subgroups of staffers produced ambiguous findings. 
Although a descriptive analysis confirmed that staffers with administrative tasks do indeed have 
weaker ties to their parties, this observation hardly yielded significant results in the explanatory 
analysis. Nonetheless, a small effect suggests that this observation does apply to active forms of 
involvement such as holding an internal party position or standing for election. Although limited, 
this provides some preliminary evidence for the assumption that parties are prefer to recruit 
politically involved candidates to carry out political-strategic tasks such as communication, policy 
advice, organizational work and management.  
 
The anticipated variation between party branches (central office, parliamentary party and 
ministerial cabinets) was turned on its head by both the descriptive and explanatory analysis. 
Contrary to our expectations, staffers from parliamentary party groups consistently show higher 
rates of political involvement. Consequently, the participation of staff with a political involvement 
is lower within the important power houses of Belgian parties: central offices and ministerial 
cabinets. This suggests that staffers who are involved more closely in consequential decision-
making by party presidents and members of government actually have a weaker political 
connection to their party. One the hand, this might demonstrate a more meritocratic or 
technocratic philosophy, meaning that parties and political elites put more emphasis on skills and 
expertise when recruiting the staff of influential political figures. On the other hand, staffers 
without a connection to a party’s political base and ideology could widen the gap between elites 
and voters or party members. The implications of such a recruitment policy on the democratic 
accountability of political elites and their staff could be an interesting avenue for future research.  
  
Finally, the analysis suggests that the organizational culture of parties has a considerable impact 
on the activism among its staffers. Especially the model dealing with current membership 
indicates that the level of involvement is heavily influenced by a party’s formal and informal 
expectations. However, it’s too early to draw definitive conclusions on this front. Uncovering the 
underlying variables associated with this variation between parties (party strength, membership, 
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party age, ideological position) requires additional cases. This is exactly our aim, as we intend to 
include staffers from Francophone Belgian and Dutch parties in the dataset.  
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